On Gandhian philosophy, socialism, and communism.

SignificanceElectrical burns can cause severe damage to the nervous system, resulting in autonomic dysfunction with reduced cerebral perfusion. However, few studies have investigated these consequences.AimTo elucidate changes in prefrontal cerebral hemodynamics using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) during the head-up tilt table test (HUT) for patients with electrical burns.ApproachWe recruited 17 patients with acute electrical burns within 1 week after their accidents and 10 healthy volunteers. The NIRS parameters acquired using an fNIRS device attached to the forehead were analyzed in five (...) distinct HUT phases.ResultsBased on their HUT response patterns, patients with electrical burns were classified into the group with abnormal HUT results (APG, n = 4) or normal HUT results (NPG, n = 13) and compared with the healthy control (HC, n = 10) participants. We found trends in hemodynamic changes during the HUT that distinguished HC, NPG, and APG. Reduced cerebral perfusion and decreased blood oxygenation during the HUT were found in both the NPG and APG groups. Patients with electrical burns had autonomic dysfunction compared to the HC participants.ConclusionsUsing fNIRS, we observed that acute-stage electrical burn injuries could affect cerebral perfusion. (shrink)

Time distortion in individuals with social anxiety has been defined as the seemingly slower passage of time in social situations and is related to both arousal and valence. Consequently, adaptive behavior is disrupted and interpersonal situations avoided. We explored the effects of valence and arousal on time distortion in individuals with social anxiety. Participants were assigned to two groups, High Anxiety (HA) and Low Anxiety (LA), presented with four types of facial expression stimuli (positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal, negative-high arousal, and (...) negative-low arousal), and asked to estimate the duration of stimulus presentation. Results indicated that, relative to other stimuli, the HA and LA groups perceived longer presentation for high-arousal negative and low-arousal positive stimuli, respectively. These findings suggest that anxious individuals’ time distortion was more severe in situations that evoked high arousal and involved negative emotion. (shrink)

We investigate corporate giving behaviors of prestigious business award winners in Korea. In particular, we examine whether firms strategically use corporate giving to enhance corporate reputation. We find that award winners generally make more charitable contributions than nonwinners prior to winning awards and maintain significant charitable contributions after winning awards; multiple award winners make even more charitable contributions than single-award winners; and an increase in charitable contributions does not raise the probability of winning awards in the year after the increase. (...) The results suggest that CEOs of award-winning firms do not use corporate giving opportunistically to enhance their status and reputation. Rather, significant charitable contributions by award winners may be indicative of a sound business strategy to maximize long-term firm value. (shrink)

A robust stakeholder analysis requires extensive conceptual and empirical work. Yet it is often unclear how to effectively do so. This paper introduces a new method—the Stakeholder Tokens—for designers to elicit a more inclusive set of stakeholders and gain better understanding of stakeholder interrelationships and dynamics. Stakeholder Tokens present a playful hands-on design approach to support value sensitive design stakeholder analyses by employing a style of role play.

Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe (2003, 2004) and Mendlow (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2004a). I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under (...) the biasing effect, such tendencies ought to have no bearing upon philosophical analyses of the concept of intentional action. (shrink)

We argue that in contemporary business organizations, in which fundamental purpose is construed to be increased value—especially in ‘participative’ organizations, in which non–hierarchal interaction (for example, work teams) is the norm; and in ‘adaptive’ organizations, in which unpredictable change is the rule—a process of values covenanting will be much more valueable than just espoused values or even values covenants. We propose such a process model for organizational values covenanting and argue that such covenanting reflects an anthropomorphism of the human character (...) development process, validated in terms of the theory of viable systems. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia entry on accounts of mental causation, starting from Descartes to the present.

This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.

Why is a red face not really red? How do we decide that this book is a textbook or not? Conceptual spaces provide the medium on which these computations are performed, but an additional operation is needed: Contrast. By contrasting a reddish face with a prototypical face, one gets a prototypical ‘red’. By contrasting this book with a prototypical textbook, the lack of exercises may pop out. Dynamic contrasting is an essential operation for converting perceptions into predicates. The existence of (...) dynamic contrasting may contribute to explaining why lexical meanings correspond to convex regions of conceptual spaces. But it also explains why predication is most of the time opportunistic, depending on context. While off-line conceptual similarity is a holistic operation, the contrast operation provides a context-dependent distance that creates ephemeral predicative judgments that are essential for interfacing conceptual spaces with natural language and with reasoning. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether corporate philanthropic decisions are associated with a firm’s listing status and business group affiliation. Analyzing a large sample of public and private firms in Korea, we find that public firms make more charitable contributions than private firms and business group-affiliated firms make more charitable contributions than non-affiliated firms. The results suggest that public firms, owing to greater public scrutiny, and business groups, owing to higher political costs, are encouraged to make more corporate charitable contributions. Further, we (...) find that greater corporate giving by public firms than private firms is more pronounced for business group-affiliated firms, compared with non-affiliated firms. The result is consistent with business groups’ strategic coordination of their affiliates’ philanthropic decisions to tunnel business group resources out to controlling shareholders who hold a larger portion of private affiliates than public affiliates. (shrink)

One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states (...) with states of our brain. Insofar as Davidson’s thesis is an ontological one – about the existence of laws or otherwise modally significant connections between the mental and the physical – I think his critics are correct: Davidson has not provided us with a successful argument for psychophysical anomalism. There is, however, a different argument, also based upon considerations about the normativity of intentionality that lead to an equally important conclusion. The conclusion is not ontological but rather epistemic: if thoughts do indeed display normativity, it is hard to understand how they would arise out of mere mechanical occurrences in the brain. To borrow a well-worn phrase, there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental and the physical. Originally coined to capture the epistemic darkness we confront in our attempt to understand phenomenal experiences in purely physical terms, the idea has yet to be explored in the area of contentful mental states or intentionality in general. My argument shall be this: considerations about the normativity of intentionality demonstrate that there is an explanatory gap between the intentional and the physical. In fact, if there were laws of the kind Davidson denies, then the world be more mysterious than if no such laws existed. The presence of an explanatory gap explains why this is so. (shrink)